Walmart, This Is What Happens When You’re Stuck in the Middle

 

The Grocerant Guru® on why Walmart, Kroger and Publix are discovering that the middle of grocery retail is becoming the most dangerous place to be.

Walmart has a customer problem hiding inside what otherwise looks like a very large success story.

It is not that Walmart is losing shoppers. It is that the shoppers Walmart needs most are increasingly deciding that they can get a better deal, a better experience, better products—or all three—somewhere else.

That is what happens when you get stuck in the middle.

New Numerator data makes the point dramatically. Gen Z shoppers added 77 million trips and $3.4 billion in spending at Walmart over the past year, including nearly $1.2 billion more in beverages, snacks, candy and frozen foods. Higher-income households added another 115 million trips and $8.9 billion in spending, much of it online.

But here is the problem: Walmart's historic customer base is moving in the opposite direction.

Boomers made 160 million fewer Walmart trips for CPG purchases, taking $6.2 billion in spending with them. Walmart recovered only $3.5 billion of that through Boomer online shopping. Amazon, meanwhile, captured another $5 billion in Boomer CPG spending.

Lower-income households moved $7.8 billion of spending away from Walmart stores, while Walmart recovered $7.3 billion online.

The numbers tell a much more interesting story than simply saying Walmart is winning Gen Z.

Walmart is replacing customers rather than simply growing customers.

And replacement is not the same thing as loyalty.

The Middle Is Getting Squeezed

For decades, Walmart owned an extraordinarily powerful position: good enough products, very broad assortment, enormous scale and low prices.

But grocery retail has changed.

Consumers now have more choices, more information, more digital tools and more reasons to shop multiple stores.

FMI's 2026 U.S. Grocery Shopper Trends research found that consumers visit more than five grocery banners per month on average.

That is the new competitive reality.

Consumers don't necessarily choose one grocery store anymore.

They choose the best retailer for the mission.

ALDI can be the value mission.

Costco can be the stock-up mission.

Whole Foods can be the quality mission.

Trader Joe's can be the discovery mission.

WinCo can be the low-price bulk-and-basket mission.

Lidl can be the value-plus-quality mission.

A traditional supermarket can win the fresh-food mission.

And Walmart can become the retailer consumers visit when it happens to be convenient.

That is a very different competitive position.

Look at ALDI

ALDI isn't trying to be everything to everybody.

It is aggressively defining what it stands for.

In January 2026, ALDI announced plans to open more than 180 stores during 2026, bringing its U.S. store count close to 2,800, with a goal of reaching 3,200 stores by the end of 2028.

Even more telling: ALDI said 17 million new customers visited its stores in 2025, and approximately one in three U.S. households shopped at ALDI during the year.

That is not merely a price story.

It is a positioning story.

ALDI has made the shopping experience itself part of the brand.

WinCo Understands the Value Mission

WinCo takes another route.

Its proposition is remarkably simple: low prices without making customers jump through loyalty-program hoops.

The employee-owned retailer describes itself as the “Supermarket Low Price Leader,” and its sales specials are available to everyone—no rewards card and no minimum purchase required.

That simplicity matters.

When a consumer walks into a WinCo, the retailer doesn't need a complicated explanation for why it exists.

Price is the message.

And when inflation has changed the psychological relationship consumers have with food prices, that clarity becomes powerful.

Lidl Is Selling Value Without Apologizing for Quality

Lidl is attacking the same middle from a different angle.

Its U.S. stores are built around a curated assortment, private brands, fresh food and imported products—while maintaining a value proposition.

Lidl says approximately 80% of its products are private label, and its U.S. footprint now exceeds 190 stores.

More importantly, Placer.ai data cited by Grocery Dive showed Lidl visits increased 4.9% year over year during the first half of 2025, compared with a 1.5% increase for the overall grocery segment.

That is what a differentiated proposition looks like.

Lidl isn't merely saying, "We're another supermarket."

It is saying:

You can get quality here without paying supermarket prices.

That is a much sharper message.

And Yes, Winn-Dixie Belongs in This Conversation

Winn-Dixie is an especially interesting example because it is attempting to reclaim relevance through neighborhood service, value and fresh food.

In January 2026, Southeastern Grocers officially became The Winn-Dixie Company and described the strategy as strengthening neighborhoods while delivering value and service.

Meanwhile, seven former Harveys locations were converted to Winn-Dixie stores in 2026 as the company consolidated its banners around the Winn-Dixie identity.

The lesson isn't that Winn-Dix has solved grocery retail.

The lesson is that a legacy retailer has to stand for something.

Walmart, Kroger and Publix: Three Different Versions of the Middle

This is where the grocery industry's current story gets particularly interesting.

Walmart isn't alone.

Kroger and Publix are also facing an increasingly complicated consumer landscape, although their situations are different.

Kroger's first quarter 2026 identical sales, excluding fuel, increased only 1.0%, while e-commerce sales grew 19%.

Publix provides an even more revealing data point.

Its 2025 sales increased 5% to $62.7 billion, but comparable-store sales rose 3.5%, with the company explicitly noting that inflation contributed to comparable-sales growth.

Then the environment changed.

In the second quarter of 2026, Publix sales increased only 1%, while comparable-store sales declined 0.5%. For the first six months, sales increased 1.5%, while comparable-store sales declined 0.3%. Publix said economic conditions affecting consumer spending contributed to the decline.

So I would not say Walmart, Kroger and Publix are all "failing."

That would be lazy analysis.

I would say something more important:

The traditional supermarket model is finding it increasingly difficult to command the center of the consumer's wallet.

The Data From 2024 to 2026 Tells the Story

In 2024, food-at-home prices increased just 1.2%, dramatically below the 5.0% increase in 2023 and 11.4% increase in 2022. Yet consumers were still feeling the accumulated effect of several years of food inflation.

And the consumer's response was not simply "buy less."

Consumers became better shoppers.

They traded between brands.

They increased private-label purchases.

They changed stores.

They changed channels.

They changed basket composition.

By 2025, USDA data showed food-at-home prices increased 2.3%, while food-away-from-home prices increased 3.8%.

And the channel itself continued to fragment.

FMI and NIQ reported in 2025 that more than 90% of grocery shoppers were shopping both online and in stores, with online grocery sales projected to reach $388 billion, or nearly 25% of the market, by 2027.

By 2026, the omnichannel shift had become even more important: FMI and NIQ reported that online sales generated nearly three-quarters of total grocery dollar growth in 2025, with the U.S. online grocery market projected to reach $452 billion by 2028.

And the price pressure isn't gone.

The July 2026 CPI showed food-at-home prices were still 2.7% higher year over year, with fruits and vegetables up 5.1% and nonalcoholic beverages up 4.1%.

USDA's July 2026 forecast calls for food-at-home prices to increase 2.7% for the full year, with beef and veal among the categories expected to rise faster than their historical averages.

In other words, consumers are still shopping in an inflationary environment—but they have become much more sophisticated about where, what and how they buy.

Private Label Is No Longer a Backup Plan

This may be the biggest warning sign for traditional supermarkets.

Circana reported that U.S. private-brand sales had already surpassed $217 billion and continued gaining momentum.

Then NIQ reported in 2025 that 69% of global respondents viewed private label as good value for money and 68% considered it a good alternative to national brands.

In 2026, FMI found that 92% of U.S. grocery shoppers had store-brand products in their homes, private-brand dollar sales were growing 2.8% year over year, and 94% said they would continue buying private brands even if grocery prices declined.

And here's the kicker:

59% of Gen Z shoppers said they had purchased more private-brand products during the past year.

That means private label isn't simply an economic response anymore.

It is becoming brand preference.

That changes the game for Walmart.

It also changes the game for Kroger.

It changes the game for Publix.

And it changes the game for every traditional grocer that still thinks the consumer's decision begins with a national brand.

The Grocerant Guru® View: Walmart Has a Positioning Problem

Walmart is still enormous.

The company generated $713.2 billion in fiscal 2026 revenue, serves approximately 280 million customers and members each week and operates more than 10,900 stores across 19 countries.

Those numbers are extraordinary.

But scale is not a strategy.

And here's where the Grocerant Guru® sees the problem.

Walmart is simultaneously trying to become:

cheaper than everybody, better than expected, more premium than before, more digital, more convenient, more fashionable and more appealing to higher-income consumers—while retaining its historic value shopper.

That is a very difficult brand architecture.

The latest results make the issue harder to ignore.

Walmart's second-quarter U.S. comparable sales increased just 2.6%, its weakest comparable-sales performance in six years, even as e-commerce grew 24%.

That tells me Walmart is not facing a simple traffic problem.

It is facing a relevance and mix problem.

The retailer is gaining younger and wealthier consumers while losing significant spending from some of its historic customers.

That is not necessarily bad.

But if Walmart simply keeps replacing yesterday's customers with tomorrow's customers, it must continually reinvent the reason both groups should choose Walmart.

And that is where being stuck in the middle becomes dangerous.

 

Three Insights From the Grocerant Guru®

1. Stop Managing the Middle—Own a Mission

The future isn't about being everything to everybody.

ALDI owns value simplicity.

WinCo owns low-price shopping.

Lidl owns curated value plus discovery.

Winn-Dixie is attempting to own neighborhood value and service.

Walmart needs to determine what it uniquely owns in the consumer's mind beyond "low prices."

Because if low price is the entire proposition, ALDI, Lidl, WinCo and increasingly sophisticated private brands will keep attacking it from below.

The answer isn't more SKUs. It's more relevance.

2. Food Is Moving From Basket Size to Meal Solutions

The old grocery metric was the basket.

The new opportunity is the meal mission.

Consumers don't wake up thinking, "I need to increase my grocery basket."

They think:

"What's for dinner?"

"What can I eat right now?"

"What can I take to work?"

"What can I feed the kids?"

"What can I make in 10 minutes?"

That is precisely where the Grocerant intersects grocery retail.

Ready-2-Eat and Heat-N-Eat fresh food can transform a commodity grocery trip into a food experience.

Walmart should not merely sell ingredients.

It should own more solutions for eating.

3. Don't Chase Customers—Create Reasons for Consumers to Choose You

This is the biggest lesson.

Walmart's Gen Z gains are encouraging.

Its higher-income gains are encouraging.

But the loss of $6.2 billion in Boomer CPG spending is not something a retailer should simply explain away because another segment grew.

The same principle applies to Kroger and Publix.

Consumers are becoming portfolio shoppers.

They will visit five or more grocery banners in a month.

The winner will not necessarily be the retailer that captures every trip.

The winner will be the retailer that captures the most important missions.

That is the difference between a store that consumers occasionally visit and a brand consumers intentionally choose.

The Grocerant Guru® bottom line:

Walmart doesn't have a traffic problem.

Kroger doesn't simply have a price problem.

Publix doesn't simply have an inflation problem.

The industry has a relevance problem.

The consumer has moved.

The question is whether the supermarket has moved with them—or is still standing in the middle, waiting for yesterday's customer to come back.

For international corporate presentations, educational forums, or keynotes contact: Steven Johnson Grocerant Guru® at Tacoma, WA based Foodservice Solutions.  His extensive experience as a multi-unit restaurant operator, consultant, brand / product positioning expert and public speaking will leave success clues for all. For more information visit www.GrocerantGuru.com , www.FoodserviceSolutions.us or call    1-253-759-7869

What Are They Talking About? Albertsons, AI and the Dangerous Addiction to Basket Size

 

Yesterday’s Metrics May Make a Legacy Grocer Look Right for a Month. They Could Make Them Wrong for a Year. There is something wonderfully modern—and potentially very old-fashioned—about the latest Albertsons story according to Steven Johnson Grocerant Guru® at Tacoma, WA based Foodservice Solutions®.

Albertsons is using artificial intelligence to make shoppers’ baskets bigger.

According to The Wall Street Journal, Albertsons says shoppers using its conversational AI tools generate baskets approximately 10% larger, while shoppers using more complex AI experiences—such as recipe creation and dietary-specific shopping—produce baskets as much as 26% larger.

That is a real accomplishment.

And Albertsons deserves credit for doing something many retailers have struggled to do: turning an emerging technology into a measurable commercial result.

But here is the question the grocery industry should be asking:

What if Albertsons is measuring the wrong victory?

What if AI is not primarily a basket-building machine?

What if AI is actually telling Albertsons something far more important about how consumers now shop for food?

That distinction matters.

Because a bigger basket can make yesterday's grocery manager look brilliant.

But understanding why consumers are shopping differently is what determines whether that manager is still relevant next year.

And that is where the grocery industry's obsession with legacy metrics—including basket size, average transaction value, units per transaction and weekly sales—can become dangerous.

The Grocery Industry Has a Basket Problem

For decades, grocery executives were trained to think about the store as a destination.

The consumer came to the supermarket.

The consumer pushed a cart.

The consumer filled the cart.

The retailer measured the size of the basket.

More items were good.

More dollars were better.

More trips were better still.

That model made perfect sense when the supermarket was one of the dominant places where consumers purchased food.

But the consumer did not sign a contract promising to remain loyal to the supermarket.

The consumer migrated.

The food dollar migrated.

The meal migrated.

The occasion migrated.

And increasingly, the consumer is shopping across channels rather than inside a single channel.

That is the story the industry's legacy metrics don't tell very well.

Look Back to 1990: The Beginning of the Migration

In 1990, approximately 46% of restaurant traffic was already off-premise, up from 44% in 1987. Carryout was the dominant form of off-premise restaurant business, although drive-thru was beginning to accelerate.

That was not a small behavioral footnote.

It was an early warning.

Consumers were beginning to say:

“I want restaurant food. I just don't necessarily want to eat it in your restaurant.”

That distinction eventually transformed foodservice.

And grocery executives who were looking only at supermarket transactions could easily miss it.

NPD data provide another fascinating marker. Americans averaged approximately 55 restaurant takeout meals per person in 1990. By 2000, that figure had climbed to approximately 70 meals per person—a gain of roughly 27% in a decade.

Meanwhile, in 2000, restaurant dining itself declined to approximately 64 meals per person, down from 66 in 1999. Takeout was not some futuristic concept. It was already becoming a mainstream meal occasion.

The lesson was sitting in plain sight:

Consumers weren't abandoning foodservice. They were changing the way they consumed it.

And Grocery Was Changing Too

The same period produced another important signal.

Supermarket foodservice sales were estimated at approximately $4.71 billion in 1990.

By 1997, supermarket foodservice had grown to approximately $14.82 billion—more than three times the 1990 level.

That was the beginning of what we now call the grocerant opportunity.

The supermarket wasn't simply selling ingredients anymore.

It was beginning to sell solutions to the meal problem.

Ready-to-eat.

Heat-and-eat.

Prepared meals.

Deli foods.

Grab-and-go.

Home meal replacement.

The consumer was increasingly outsourcing some of the labor of eating.

That trend did not disappear.

It accelerated.

Meanwhile, the C-Store Was Learning the Same Lesson

Convenience stores offer perhaps the clearest historical example of why legacy metrics can be misleading.

In the early 1990s, a convenience store was still largely understood as a place to buy gasoline, tobacco, beverages, snacks and other immediate-consumption items.

But the industry's innovators began looking at something different:

What if the c-store could become a food destination?

7-Eleven began shipping fresh food products daily during the 1990s as it responded to consumers who wanted fresher, more convenient food.

By 2000, 7-Eleven was operating a sophisticated refrigerated distribution system, including a fleet of 275 refrigerated trucks delivering fresh food.

That was not merely merchandising.

It was a recognition that the consumer's definition of "where I buy food" was changing.

And today the numbers are extraordinary.

NACS reports that foodservice accounted for 27.7% of convenience-store in-store sales in 2024, while producing 38.6% of in-store gross margin dollars. Prepared food represented 72.6% of foodservice sales.

In 2025, foodservice represented 28.5% of c-store in-store sales and 38.9% of in-store gross-margin dollars, with prepared food representing approximately 74% of foodservice sales.

That is not a gas station with food.

That is a food retailer that happens to sell gasoline.

And that is exactly the kind of channel migration legacy grocery metrics can miss.

The Grocery Store Lost Its Monopoly on the Meal

Here is perhaps the most important long-term food fact.

USDA data show that food-away-from-home spending has steadily taken share from food-at-home spending.

In 2000, consumers spent approximately 9.9% of disposable personal income on food, with 5.7% going to food at home and 4.2% to food away from home.

By 2025, consumers were still spending approximately 9.7% of disposable income on food, but the split had changed dramatically: about 4.8% on food at home versus 4.9% on food away from home.

The consumer didn't necessarily decide:

"I am a grocery shopper."

or

"I am a restaurant customer."

The consumer decided:

"I need dinner."

And then chose the channel that best solved dinner.

That is the real competitive battlefield.

Today's Consumer Is a Food Shopper, Not a Grocery Shopper

This distinction is critical.

The grocery industry frequently describes consumers as grocery shoppers.

But consumers don't wake up thinking:

“I need to increase my basket size today.”

They wake up thinking:

·       What's for dinner?

·       What can I make quickly?

·       What can I afford?

·       What do the kids want?

·       Do I have time to cook?

·       Should I order?

·       Should I pick something up?

·       Should I stop at a c-store?

·       Can the grocery deli solve this?

·       Can I get everything delivered?

·       Can AI figure it out for me?

That is a fundamentally different consumer mindset.

And current data demonstrate just how fragmented the grocery journey has become.

FMI's 2026 U.S. Grocery Shopper Trends research found that Americans visit an average of 5.4 different grocery banners each month. Gen Z and millennials shop across even more banners. The average household makes about 2.8 grocery shopping trips per week.

So when a retailer celebrates a larger basket, the more important question may be:

Did we increase the consumer's share of stomach—or simply make one transaction bigger?

Those are not the same thing.

The Basket Can Be Bigger While the Relationship Gets Smaller

This is where I believe the Albertsons story becomes much more interesting.

Albertsons says its AI tools encourage shoppers to move across categories instead of "spearfishing" for one item.

Exactly.

But notice what just happened.

The technology did not simply convince someone to buy another box of cereal.

It helped the consumer construct a meal occasion.

A recipe.

A dietary solution.

A shopping mission.

An event.

The AI is connecting the dots between categories because the consumer's mission crosses categories.

That is much more important than the 10% or 26% basket increase.

The technology is revealing that the consumer doesn't naturally think in supermarket departments.

Consumers think:

“Taco night.”

“Dinner for four.”

“High-protein lunch.”

“I need something quick.”

“I'm watching what I eat.”

“What can I make with what's already in my refrigerator?”

The consumer thinks in occasions.

Legacy grocery management thinks in aisles.

That is the strategic disconnect.

Albertsons Asked Technology for a Number—and Technology Gave It One

I want to say something nice about technology here.

Technology is doing exactly what Albertsons asked it to do.

The company asked AI to help improve the shopping experience and generate measurable ROI.

AI helped generate larger baskets.

That's good.

Very good.

But technology can give executives the answer they request without necessarily giving them the strategic insight they need.

The more valuable insight may be this:

AI is revealing that consumers want help solving food occasions, not simply finding products.

That is a much bigger opportunity.

And it goes far beyond Albertsons.

eMarketer estimates that approximately 79.6 million U.S. consumers will use AI platforms and assistants for shopping in 2026, up about 25% from the prior year. It projects AI platforms could influence as much as 13.7% of U.S. retail ecommerce sales by 2029, representing approximately $225 billion.

That means the next grocery battleground may not be:

Who has the biggest basket?

It may be:

Who gets invited into the consumer's decision before the basket exists?

That's a very different game.

The Consumer Has Moved Again

Consider the progression.

1990

The supermarket was dominant.

Restaurant off-premise traffic was already approximately 46%.

Restaurant takeout averaged roughly 55 meals per person.

Supermarket foodservice was about $4.7 billion.

Convenience stores were primarily convenience destinations, with foodservice still an emerging proposition.

2000

Restaurant takeout had reached approximately 70 meals per person.

Restaurant meals eaten on-premise were approximately 64 per person.

Supermarket foodservice had already exploded compared with 1990.

C-stores were investing in fresh food and prepared food.

And consumers were increasingly looking for easy meals rather than simply ingredients.

2025–2026

Food-away-from-home spending has essentially reached parity with food-at-home spending.

C-store foodservice is approaching 30% of in-store sales and nearly 40% of gross-margin dollars.

Grocery shoppers visit multiple banners every month.

Digital technology is now used by 77% of grocery shoppers before shopping and 71% while shopping.

And grocery's prepared-food operation is increasingly competing directly with restaurants.

FMI's 2025 foodservice-at-retail research found that consumers choosing deli-prepared food instead of restaurant meals more than doubled—from 12% in 2017 to 28% in 2025. More than half of Americans, 53%, are also combining deli-prepared foods with food from their own kitchens.

That's not a grocery category story.

That's a food-channel story.

The Legacy Grocery Sector Is Looking Backward

This is where the phrase “What are they talking about?” comes into play.

When a grocery executive says:

"Our basket is up."

My response is:

Compared with what?

And more importantly:

What happened to the consumer before and after that basket?

Did the customer visit you less frequently?

Did they shop another banner?

Did they order restaurant takeout?

Did they buy lunch at a c-store?

Did they purchase prepared food instead of ingredients?

Did they use delivery?

Did they use AI to determine what to buy?

Did they buy fewer items per trip but make more trips?

Circana has already documented this tension. In its analysis of changing grocery behavior, quick trips were growing while the number of items purchased per trip was falling. Quick trips grew 8.9%, while items per trip declined 11%; importantly, consumers were purchasing more items from the perimeter, including deli-prepared and heat-and-eat meals.

That is precisely why basket size alone can become a trap.

A smaller basket isn't necessarily bad.

A larger basket isn't necessarily good.

The question is:

What consumer behavior produced it?

The New Grocery Scorecard

The legacy grocery scorecard was built around:

Basket size.

Average transaction.

Units per transaction.

Same-store sales.

Promotional lift.

Trips.

Market share.

Those metrics still matter.

But they are no longer enough.

The new scorecard needs to measure:

Share of meal occasions.

Share of prepared-food occasions.

Foodservice penetration.

Cross-channel share of stomach.

Digital decision influence.

Customer mission capture.

Time-to-meal.

Prepared-food repeat rate.

Consumer lifetime value across channels.

How often the retailer is chosen before the consumer chooses the product.

That last metric may ultimately be the most important.

Because the Competition Isn't the Grocery Store Anymore

The competition is not simply Kroger versus Albertsons.

It isn't Walmart versus Costco.

It isn't supermarket A versus supermarket B.

The competition is:

Whoever can solve the consumer's food problem best.

That could be a supermarket.

A club store.

A dollar store.

A restaurant.

A fast-food drive-thru.

A convenience store.

A grocery deli.

A meal kit.

A delivery platform.

Or increasingly, an AI assistant that tells the consumer what to buy and where to buy it.

That is why the grocery industry's obsession with historical benchmarks worries me.

Yesterday's consumer did not have today's choices.

And tomorrow's consumer will have choices that don't exist today.

Three Warnings From the Grocerant Guru®

1. Stop Worshipping the Basket

A bigger basket is a result.

It is not a strategy.

If management celebrates a 10% larger basket while failing to understand why customers are shopping across five-plus grocery banners, eating restaurant food, buying prepared food at c-stores and using AI to construct meals, management may be optimizing the rearview mirror.

Measure the consumer's total food journey—not just the transaction that occurred inside your four walls.

2. Stop Managing Departments and Start Managing Meal Occasions

Consumers don't eat "deli."

They eat lunch.

They don't eat "produce."

They eat dinner.

They don't buy "ingredients."

They solve meals.

The grocery retailer that can own the meal occasion has a much greater opportunity than the retailer that simply gets better at moving individual SKUs.

The future of grocery is not the biggest basket. It is the best food solution.

3. Legacy Grocery Must Escape the Past Before the Past Becomes the Future

There is nothing wrong with experience.

There is nothing wrong with proven metrics.

There is nothing wrong with knowing how the grocery business worked in 1990, 2000 or 2010.

The danger begins when yesterday's success becomes today's strategy.

The consumer has already moved from:

Store → aisle → product → basket

to:

Need → occasion → solution → channel → meal.

And now AI is beginning to insert itself before the entire sequence.

That is why the legacy grocery sector may be in a more dangerous position than simply being stuck in the middle.

It could be stuck in the past.

And being stuck in the past is far more dangerous than being stuck in the middle—because management can continue to produce perfectly respectable numbers while the consumer quietly moves somewhere else.

The Grocerant Guru® Bottom Line:

Albertsons may have discovered how to make the basket bigger.

The bigger opportunity is discovering why the consumer wanted help building the basket in the first place.

That is the insight.

The basket is merely the receipt.

And in the food business, the receipt tells you what happened. The consumer tells you what happens next.

Are you ready for some fresh ideations? Do your food marketing ideas look more like yesterday than tomorrow? Interested in learning how our Grocerant Guru® can edify your retail food brand while creating a platform for consumer convenient meal participation, differentiation and individualization?  Email us at: Steve@FoodserviceSolutions.us or visit: us on our social media sites by clicking one of the following links: Facebook,  LinkedIn, or Twitter